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Abstract
This article draws on the sociology of expectations to examine the construction of expectations of ‘ethical AI’ and
considers the implications of these expectations for communication governance. We first analyse a range of public
documents to identify the key actors, mechanisms and issues which structure societal expectations around artificial
intelligence (AI) and an emerging discourse on ethics. We then explore expectations of AI and ethics through a survey of
members of the public. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the role of AI in communication gover-
nance. We find that, despite societal expectations that we can design ethical AI, and public expectations that developers
and governments should share responsibility for the outcomes of AI use, there is a significant divergence between these
expectations and the ways in which AI technologies are currently used and governed in large scale communication
systems. We conclude that discourses of ‘ethical AI’ are generically performative, but to become more effective we need
to acknowledge the limitations of contemporary AI and the requirement for extensive human labour to meet the
challenges of communication governance. An effective ethics of AI requires domain appropriate AI tools, updated
professional practices, dignified places of work and robust regulatory and accountability frameworks.
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Introduction
Today artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, such as
machine learning (ML), are embedded in everyday
communication services. AI is also at the centre of an
immense positive, and future orientated discourse dis-
seminated by national research programmes, consul-
tancy reports and corporate statements. AI and data
science are European research and innovation priorities
with significant resources being directed towards solu-
tions which may deliver economic and social impacts.
However, a number of critical voices and corporate
scandals have highlighted the potential negative
impacts of contemporary AI on employment, democ-
racy and equality. This article identifies the key actors
shaping contemporary societal expectations of AI in
the UK and Ireland over the past decade and the mech-
anisms they use to do this. We also map the range of
expectations being created, and the emergence of a dis-
course focussed on ethics and AI. Finally, we explore
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the implications of our findings for AI in communica-
tion governance.
We situate this study within the sociology of expect-
ations (Pollock and Williams, 2016; van Lente, 2012)
and apply this approach to identify the actors who are
issuing both formal and informal articulations that
shape public expectations of AI, and to assess what
these expectations are attempting to do. Our empirical
work proceeds at two levels: first, an analysis of public
documents to identify the key actors, mechanisms and
issues currently shaping societal expectations of AI;
and, second, an analysis of a survey of members of
the public exploring awareness and expectations to
AI. Our analysis reveals shared expectations that we
can design ethical AI and that developers (especially
academic ones) will behave ethically; however, chal-
lenges remain around understanding the most impor-
tant ethical issues, how these vary from domain to
domain, and deciding who should be responsible and
accountable for negative impacts.
The sociology of expectations distinguishes between
generic, or weak, and effective, or strong, performances
of expectations. Strong societal expectations can influ-
ence the dynamic, direction and focus of technological
innovation. In our discussion, we explore the implica-
tions of societal expectations of ethical AI for current
professional practice in the design and application of
AI in communication governance. AI is just one dimen-
sion of contemporary communication governance
assemblages for transnational digital communication
services (Kerr et al., 2014), yet AI is often presented
as the sole solution to the scale, speed and complexity
of that task. This solutionism is driven by powerful
stakeholders and backed by significant investment. It
obscures the socio-technical limitations of Big Data
based forms of AI when faced with highly contextual
cultural communication and the requirement for exten-
sive human labour to train, update and support the
technologies. We ask if societal expectations that we
can create ‘ethical AI’ is simply a generic discourse
for reassuring investors, governments and users?
Furthermore, is the focus on ethical AI diverting atten-
tion away from other important ethical issues, includ-
ing how data are gathered, the conditions under which
humans develop and deploy AI in communication gov-
ernance, and the impact on users?
AI and the sociology of expectations
The history of AI is an undulating one, with positive
and negative expectations, and periods of growing hype
followed by disappointments and decline. After the
Second World War a number of new research areas
developed in the US and the UK including cybernetics,
communication theory and AI. Unlike early
communication theory, which was dominated by trans-
mission models of communication, AI had competing
definitions, goals and agendas. Fleck (1982) traces the
first use of the term ‘artificial intelligence’ to the US in
1956 where the focus was on developing computer sys-
tems with high-level reasoning in planning and mathe-
matics. This meeting gave rise to a ‘proto-
paradigmatic’ (Fleck, 1982: 177) approach which legiti-
mised and coordinated subsequent AI research and
investment in the 1960s and 1970s and gave rise to
the first significant period of positive expectations in
AI. However, by the mid-60s it became apparent that
the early approaches to AI could not scale to real-
world problems. This created the first ‘AI winter’.
A second period of growth in positive expectations
in AI occurred between the late 1960s and the early
1980s. This time the technological driver was a focus
on encoding expert domain knowledge into ‘expert sys-
tems’. For example, the MYCIN system used approx-
imately 450 hand-coded rules to diagnose blood
infections (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984), the encod-
ing of which was a highly labour intensive and costly
approach. Consequently, although expert systems
proved successful in a number of specialised applica-
tions, by the late 1980s many investors became disillu-
sioned. Further, the negative findings of the Lighthill
review of AI research in the UK undertaken in 1973
significantly depressed expectations in AI. This resulted
in much negative media coverage and led ultimately to
a reduction in investment in AI research in the UK and
the US (Fleck, 1982: 191–192).
Current interest in AI can be viewed as a third
period of growth in expectations and, as with each of
the earlier cycles, it has a distinct technological trigger
(Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation
(DBEI), 2018; European Commission (EC), 2018;
House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial
Intelligence (HLSCAI), 2018). The promise is that
ML algorithms can extract non-obvious patterns
from large datasets, and that the revealed patterns
will provide (novel) insights into problems that will
ultimately result in better decisions (Kelleher and
Tierney, 2018). The connection between modern AI
and Big Data positions it within the broader develop-
ments of the growing proliferation of sensors through-
out society, the shift to online communication, and the
growth of business models and national policies which
rely on the tracking of individuals. One consequence is
that modern AI (unlike earlier generations) is essential
for deriving maximum value from data. Another is the
development of consumer products/services, such as
speech interfaces for smart phones, smart speakers or
facial recognition software that AI facilitates. This
could mark a change in its fortunes, as technologies
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that become commercialised and domesticated are
likely to endure (Barry et al., 2017).
This brief history reveals that the meaning of AI has
evolved over time, and today the term can mean dif-
ferent things to different people. For some, the ultimate
goal of AI is to develop autonomous agents with gen-
eral intelligence, similar to human intelligence. For
others, the goal is to develop systems capable of spe-
cialist expert behaviour in a narrowly defined domain.
Further variations arise in the methods used to create
AI systems, with early research characterised as rule-
based symbol processing where the rules were hand-
crafted by a knowledge engineer. Recent AI systems,
however, are better characterised as data driven ML
systems (Kelleher, 2019). This diversity in the meanings
of AI and the methods used is important in any dis-
cussions of expectations and impact. All of these AI
systems raise important ethical questions, but the ques-
tions differ. Further, while data driven AI systems are
already present in communication, the ‘singularity’,1
may never be possible.
In order to understand the current ‘turn to AI’ this
article draws upon the sociology of expectations from
science and technology studies (STS). STS has long
explored the role that expectations perform in the man-
agement of uncertainty in innovation processes.
Expectations can be defined as statements that say
something about the future (Borup et al., 2006, van
Lente, 2012). A range of actors, and both formal and
informal mechanisms, shape expectations (Pollock and
Williams, 2016; van Lente, 2012). Formal mechanisms
include foresight and research prioritisation exercises,
which are deployed by governments, consultancy firms
and companies to rationalise future innovation agen-
das and investment. Informal expectations are ‘images,
statements and prophecies’ (van Lente, 2012: 772)
which circulate through social networks, the media,
conferences and meetings. Some informal images and
statements are provided by experts. Non-experts can
also play a role in shaping expectations via the media
and other activities. In the construction of expecta-
tions, a range of actors draw from, and add to, the
repertoire of visions that create the innovation dynamic
around a technology.
Collectively shared expectations can have a signifi-
cant influence. Previous studies have identified three
‘forces’ of expectations: they raise attention and legiti-
mate investment, they help to coordinate networks of
companies and research institutions, and they provide
heuristic guidance and direction to research and inno-
vation activities (Van Lente, 2012: 773–774).
Expectations can be said to be ‘performative’ in the
sense that they ‘do’ something, and may prompt certain
social actions. However, in his analysis of the use of
econometric models in financial markets, Mackenzie
(2008: 17) distinguishes between ‘generic’ and ‘effective’
performativity. Generic performativity is when theoret-
ical models, language or approaches are taken up in the
real world but do not make a difference to how things
are actually done, while effective performativity is
when the language or models make a difference in
practice.
Expectations can operate at different levels, from the
European research area to the national or the company
level, and the content can vary from a focus on techni-
cal, commercial or social aspects to more fictionalised
narratives. In applying this approach to AI, we con-
ducted two studies to provide a multi-level analysis of
expectations of contemporary AI. First, we analysed
key formal and informal documents and statements
on AI released since 2011 in Europe, the UK and
Ireland. Second, we conducted a survey of awareness
and expectations of AI amongst members of the public
in Ireland. Together, these studies are used to identify
key actors, formal and informal mechanisms and
shared or diverging expectations of AI. In the discus-
sion we assess the performativity of these expectations
and their implications for AI in communication
governance.
Societal actors, mechanisms and
expectations of AI
The first study followed the principles of theoretical
sampling (Gentles and Vilches, 2017). We identified a
range of secondary documents based on their theoret-
ical relevance, i.e. they outlined the strategic visions of
key actors in AI research and policy in the EU, UK and
Ireland and thus are ‘performative’ in relation to the
construction of expectations (Van Lente et al., 2013).
Our sample consists of 41 documents published since
2011 by seven types of actors: international consultan-
cies; the EC; the UK and Irish research administra-
tions; expert consultations in the UK and Ireland;
public surveys; professional associations and, state-
ments by workers and whistle-blowers (see supplemen-
tary file for details). We view these documents as
‘conduits’ of communication (after Prior, 2008),
which are impactful beyond their immediate publica-
tion. In what follows we focus on the key actors, the
mechanisms used, and the ‘order of discourse’ linking,
for example, consultants reports to public policy docu-
ments, and policy documents to statements in the
media. We also detail those actors promoting a positive
view, those promoting a negative view, and an emerg-
ing focus on ethics in/for AI.
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Positive expectations – Governments, research
institutes, IT consultants
The agendas of the national research councils in the
UK and Ireland are developed in consultation with
international IT consultancies and experts from acade-
mia and corporations, and influenced by strategic
developments by the EC. Following a decade of aus-
terity in Europe, governments, public research agencies
and companies are working hard to legitimise public
and private expenditures on research and innovation.
Further, AI research is expensive in resource and com-
putational terms. Many of the documents in this anal-
ysis justify investments in terms of economic growth,
jobs and increasing efficiency. Some refer to competi-
tion from the US and China. The UK and Irish govern-
ments rely heavily on commissioned reports from
business analysts and foresight exercises with experts
to inform their national research programmes and pri-
orities. In the UK this is supplemented by regular sur-
veys of public opinion.
In both the UK and Ireland, we can identify coali-
tions of government departments, public research agen-
cies, public research institutes and technology
companies who are active in shaping expectations of
AI. This aligns with the ‘co-ordinated’ approach to
research policy, with a strong role for public bodies
(Cath et al., 2018: 503). In our sample, we identify a
largely positive set of expectations about the potential
returns from investing in AI and can map significant
investment in AI research, infrastructure and institu-
tions (often of at least five-year duration) over the
past decade. For example, the Turing Institute was
established in 2015 as the UK’s National Institute for
Data Science following a government and public con-
sultation process (Department for Digital, Culture,
Media and Sport, 2018).2 It received almost £42 million
in government funding. In 2017 it was renamed the
National Institute for Data Science and AI, and
received another £48 million in 2018 (Press
Association, 2013). Data science and AI are listed as
national priorities in recent UK research policy docu-
ments and the Turing Institute involves collaboration
between government, corporations and universities
around the UK. In Ireland, the national research pri-
oritisation exercise (2018–2023) added AI to its prior-
ities and noted a ‘potentially disruptive effect of
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning’ (DBEI,
2018: 6). This was informed by a technology futures
exercise involving corporate, governmental and
STEM academic experts. These reports drive the
agenda of multi-institutional academic research centres
and other innovation programmes. In both the UK and
Ireland, a shared feature of strategic and competitive
public research funding is that it is must involve col-
laboration with industry.
The second actors shaping expectations around AI
are IT analysts and consultancy firms. Pollock and
Williams (2016) argue that industry analysts provide
a significant new form of expertise for technology com-
panies, investors and governments, and are a crucial
‘knowledge intermediary’ in relation to complex and
uncertain futures. They also play an important role in
naming emerging technical fields. McKinsey,
Accenture and Gartner are particularly important as
their reports and expertise are evident in UK and
Irish government policy and programme statements.
The Gartner Group describes itself as a ‘decision-
support’ company, and not a forecasting or market
research company. It is best known for its IT Hype
Cycle, which identifies five phases of a technology’s
lifecycle: the innovation trigger, the peak of inflated
expectations, the trough of disillusionment, the slope
of enlightenment and the plateau of productivity. The
last decade of Gartner’s Hype-Cycle reports includes a
number of AI related technologies: Big Data was at
peak hype in 2013, ML in 2016, and deep learning in
2018. While Gartner presents its hype cycle as an edu-
cational tool, it can also be understood as a branding
and promotion tool (Williams and Pollock, 2015:
1387). Crucially from a sociology of expectations per-
spective, while Gartner reports are a formal mechanism
shaping expectations, images of Gartner’s Hype-Cycles
are an informal mechanism which circulate widely in
the media and in professional talks. They define key
concepts for technological trends and thus can be
seen as ‘generically performative’ in establishing
expectations around emerging IT fields, including at
the moment, AI.
Our analysis of publicly available consultancy
reports on AI found a focus on ML and deep learning.
They identified significant ‘cost reductions’ and ‘effi-
ciency’ gains to be made by corporate investors includ-
ing around the automation of decision making and
customer engagement. Using reassuring language and
a positive tone, these documents provide legitimation
through authoritative statements. For example,
McKinsey (2018: 7) provides hundreds of AI use
cases to show where ‘value is to be captured’, while
Accenture Labs (2018) model how AI will double the
growth of economies by 2035. Gartner (2019) helps
clients to ‘separate AI hype from reality’ according to
a five phase ‘AI Maturity Model’: ‘as enterprises evolve
their AI expectations and projects, the technology will
mature to have more transformative and strategic
impacts’. These positive visions help to mediate uncer-
tainty (Borup et al., 2006), and their terminology is
referenced in many policy documents. For example,
in 2014, the Irish policy agency Forfa´s published a
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report on future Big Data skill needs. Their definition
of ‘deep analytical talent’ came from a McKinsey
Global Institute study (Manyika et al., 2011). The EC
(2018) Communication on AI also cites McKinsey and
Accenture reports.
Negative expectations – Workers, whistle-blowers
and contrarians
Since 2011 whistle-blowers and workers have made a
number of revelations surrounding the use of data sci-
ence and AI by companies and governments. The first
involved Edward Snowden in 2013, a contractor for the
National Security Agency in the US. In a series of coor-
dinated media stories, he revealed the extent of the
transnational state security surveillance apparatus
and dataveillance of online communications (Lyon,
2014). Then the Cambridge Analytica scandal in
2017/2018 saw contractor, Christopher Wylie, reveal-
ing problematic data practices at Facebook and other
companies (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018).
Both these revelations triggered major controversies,
significant media commentary and public inquiries.
Further, the media has covered how groups of employ-
ees at Google and Amazon have publicly refused to
cooperate with AI development for military and law
enforcement purposes,3 while other stories have
revealed problematic work practices for moderators
of AI-driven social media content (O’Connell, 2019).
Between 2014 and 2018 another set of well-known
individuals made high profile negative comments about
future AI, including the academic physicist Stephen
Hawking, and entrepreneurs Bill Gates and Elon
Musk. These commentaries largely focus on the poten-
tial that AI might become super-intelligent. Galanos
(2019) traces how these ‘contrarians’ have been
widely cited in EC, UK and US policy documents
and notes that while these entrepreneurs and academics
are experts in their own domains, none are experts in
AI. While statements by whistle-blowers and workers
focus on the use and misuse of AI in everyday
practices, contrarians focus on a future AI, which
may never exist.
Ethical issues and a European approach to AI
These negative interventions have been, in Mackenzie’s
terms, ‘generically’ performative in structuring expect-
ations around AI. Since 2016 a focus on ethics in rela-
tion to the development, deployment and use of AI has
emerged in AI policy and strategy documents in our
sample. The Royal Society in the UK has conducted a
programme of activities on AI and ML, identifying
public concerns about potential harms, worker replace-
ment and impacts on human experience and choices
(Royal Society, 2017). In 2016, the Turing Institute
added a data ethics research group and an ethics advi-
sory group. In the same year, the Ada Lovelace
Institute was established (£5 million over 5 years) to
specifically ‘inform public understanding of AI and
data science’, to create a ‘shared understanding of the
ethical issues arising from data and AI’ and to ‘define
and inform good practice in the design and develop-
ment of AI’. Finally, a House of Lords’ Select
Committee on Artificial Intelligence stated that: ‘the
Government must understand the need to build
public trust and confidence in how to use artificial intel-
ligence, as well as explain the risks’ (HLSCAI, 2018:
25). In Ireland, a number of recent EU funded research
projects have focused on ethics training in computer
science and some research centres are adding a focus
on ethics; however, to date there has been no significant
public programme or research funding on the societal
and ethical aspects of AI.
A similar turn to ethics is also evident in IT consul-
tancy reports since 2016. In the McKinsey 2011 report,
ethics is positioned as a ‘soft skill’ but there is no dis-
cussion of ethical or public interest issues. However,
another McKinsey report (Henke et al. 2016) notes
that ‘thorny ethical and societal questions . . . will
have to be addressed as machines gain greater intellec-
tual capabilities’ (p. 81) while observing that these
questions have ‘entered the public sphere most recently
in the context of autonomous vehicles, and they seem
likely to be relevant in many other contexts’ (p. 93).
PWC (2017: 21) advise that organisations ask them-
selves if they have ‘considered the societal and ethical
implications’. Accenture Labs (2018) advocated a code
of ethics for AI, suggesting that ‘ethical debates should
be supplemented by tangible standards and best prac-
tices in the development and use of intelligent
machines’. However, none of the consultant documents
in our sample offer any detail on specific ethical chal-
lenges, or how to deal with them. Meanwhile, the codes
of ethics for professional organisations including the
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), and
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) are being updated to reflect the impact of AI
on practice, e.g. the ACM Code of Ethics and
Professional Conduct (2018) has expanded the respon-
sibility of computer engineers to include ‘awareness of
the social context in which the work will be deployed,
and competence in recognizing and navigating ethical
challenges’. The IEEE (2019) has released a set of
AI-related standards that advise developers to follow
‘values-based design methods’ but acknowledge a pref-
erence for identifiable and quantifiable ‘norms’ over
values.
A growing focus on ethics is particularly evident in
European policy documents. In March 2018, the
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European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies called for the EC to develop a common
ethical and legal framework for AI (European Group
on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE),
2018), and shortly after an EC Communication pro-
posed a ‘European approach’ to AI (EC, 2018). This
communication called for applying AI for ‘good and
for all’, and the centrality of the ‘Union’s values and
fundamental rights as well as ethical principles such as
accountability and transparency.’ The EC proposes tri-
pling research investment in AI at the European level,
supporting increased training and education in AI, and
development of appropriate legal and ethical frame-
works. Ethics is specifically mentioned as important
in relation to the development and the use of AI (EC,
2018: 13). In late 2018, the EC released its draft guide-
lines for ‘trustworthy AI’ based on the work of 52
experts around Europe. These generalised ethics guide-
lines tend to conflate all AI applications,4 implying that
the negative potential of AI is not influenced by the
context and purpose of its use. While formal
principles-based initiatives can shape societal expecta-
tions, and offer some reassurance, it is unclear as yet
how these rhetorical shifts will impact on practice in
specific domains.
Public expectations and the ethics of AI
Public surveys on attitudes to science and technology
are frequently conducted in Europe and the UK. By
contrast, and despite the significant rise in investment
in AI in Ireland, there has been no research investigat-
ing national or local attitudes to AI since 2011.5
Therefore, an exhibition featuring international artistic
and research installations on AI at the Science Gallery
in Dublin 2017 provided an opportunity to engage
directly with members of the public. The survey was
administered face-to-face over one week, and 164 indi-
viduals completed questions on their awareness of AI,
outlined their positive and negative expectations
around AI, and gave their views on the most important
ethical issues associated with AI.
The survey is not a representative public survey, but
rather provided an opportunity for researchers to
explore the expectations of a scientifically interested
public. Respondents were 55% male, aged 18–
34 years (75%) and well educated to degree level
(70%). They were predominantly white (84%), hetero-
sexual (87%) and many were non-religious (62%).
Respondents came from 25 different countries includ-
ing 27% from Ireland, 13% from America and 9%
from Britain, followed by Germany and Brazil. Many
had moved to Ireland for work. Half were working full
time, and another 10% were self-employed. The bal-
ance were working part time, were unemployed, not
available for work or were visiting as tourists. They
worked across a range of service industries, including
IT, education, the arts, finance and hospitality. Only
two worked in manufacturing, and one each in agricul-
ture and construction. Just over 60% of respondents
earned less than e35,000 a year (see supplementary files
for full demographics).
Respondent familiarity with AI ranged from expert
(1.8%), and very familiar (18.3%), to those with good
(25%), some (51.2%) or no familiarity with AI (3.7%).
Respondents associated AI with gaming, scientific
research, manufacturing and communications. The
technologies most associated with AI were self-
driving cars, robots, and communication assistants
(e.g. Siri). Other popular answers included a range of
communication technologies including games, internet
‘bots’, recommender systems and search. The fact that
respondents ranked technologies they had not experi-
enced (robots and self-driving cars) most frequently
indicates the influence of positive and negative utter-
ances on shaping societal expectations about AI.6
However, negative statements in the media and every-
day experiences of applications, such as games and
communication applications, were also important in
relation to their understanding of AI.
Positive and negative expectations of AI
Given that our respondents had relatively good aware-
ness of AI, in this section we focus on answers to two
open ended questions which asked about the primary
positive and negative issues related to AI. We con-
ducted a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006)
on the 198 positive and 144 negative responses, to iden-
tify patterns of meaning that respond to our focus on
actors, mechanisms and expectations of AI. This theo-
retically independent method is appropriate to our
sociology of expectations approach. Both positive
and negative responses were coded, with particular
attention paid to future orientated phrasing such as
‘may’, ‘might’, ‘could’ or ‘would’. From the codes, we
identified a set of themes describing positive and nega-
tive expectations.
Overall respondents felt that AI presents good
opportunities for economic growth and social progress.
Participants most frequently identified automation and
efficiency as positive aspects of AI, stating that AI will
automate dull, menial or repetitive tasks and make cer-
tain types of services more efficient and accessible.
Respondents thought AI would impact positively on
medicine, science, knowledge and the environment.
Some felt that AI might be more reliable and eliminate
human bias and errors. Some described AI as ‘servant’,
or ‘helper’ and other broader claims are provided
below (see Table 1).
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Respondents also listed automation most frequently
as a negative aspect of AI, stating that automation
might result in job losses, too much standardisation
and out of control machines. Automation was closely
followed by concerns related to security, privacy and
surveillance. A third set of concerns related to the
impact of AI on ‘humanness, knowing and knowledge’.
Respondents worried about the impact of AI on per-
sonal and social relationships, on emotions and subjec-
tivity. They were concerned about the level of public
expenditure on making machines smarter, rather than
humans, and wondered if humans should trust
machines to predict, rationalise, and rank information.
While the loss of jobs and computational creativity
were themes in the exhibition, and considerations
about unemployment and surveillance are widely dis-
cussed in public articulations, there was a lot of con-
cern in these responses for the trustworthiness of
automatically created information, a loss of human
creativity, and the lack of empathy in automated deci-
sions (see Table 2).
Overall, the positively expressed expectations reflect
the benefits of AI to individuals – by taking over jobs
that humans may not wish to or cannot do. Thus,
positive expectations view AI as a beneficial tool in
relation to social progress. The negatively expressed
expectations tend to focus more on group impacts
such as unemployment, or how AI might affect
human creativity and subjectivity. Further, they noted
the potential for increasing economic and social
inequality or malicious uses, suggesting a view of AI
as a set of interconnected systems rather than individ-
ual applications. We note that some of the positive
aspects of AI (as helper or servant) were directly related
to the negative (unemployment). These responses echo
concerns found in public surveys on AI in other coun-
tries including: inappropriate or invisible use of AI
(Fast and Horvitz, 2017), removal of human oversight,
judgment and decision making (Ipsos/MORI, 2016),
making generalised predictions about individuals
(Royal Society, 2017) and wealth inequality
(Eurobarometer, 2015). However, our survey goes
beyond previous work as open-ended questions
allowed respondents to outline how automation and
efficiency could be both positive and negative.
Further, concerns emerged about the centralisation of
control, the declining quality of jobs and the errors
created by these systems. They were also concerned
Table 2. A sample of negative expectations of AI.
Theme Participant responses
AI as a thinking machine ‘Human laziness, we may use our brains less if a machine can think for us, it could affect our free
will by making decisions based on the expertise of AI.’
‘Humans will lose sight of what it means to work hard and could become too dependent on
machines to the point where we’re unable to live without them and . . . live independently.’
AI and inequality ‘The effect that it could have on certain working classes and unemployment that could arise
from this improved efficiency.’
‘The same problems that humans have may imprint on the system.’
AI and humanity ‘It could take away some of the basics aspects of human social life’
‘Could dehumanise. Could be abused.’
Fears, including of mis-use ‘Humans potentially playing God and not being conscientious of the repercussions.’
‘With the amount of corruption and unethical behaviour in this world, AI in the wrong hands
could be extremely dangerous.’
Table 1. A sample of positive expectations of AI.
Theme Participant responses
AI as servant ‘Menial tasks that restrict our time could be done using AI and we could have more time for better
pursuits in many areas including creativity and scientific advancement.’
‘Robots could do hard repeating work.’
AI as helper ‘AI may help in our daily lives. It solves technical problems and makes technology more efficient.’
‘Advancements in technology that could help people around the world. AI being implemented into
medicine will be especially beneficial.’
Other ‘Potential for improvements in communication, healthcare etc.’
‘Grow the potential for human knowledge and achievement.’
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about the vulnerability of these systems, although there
were no direct references to military applications.7
Expectations around ethics and responsibility
Our respondents mostly experience AI in everyday
communication and gaming applications, but the ethi-
cal concerns of our respondents tended to focus on
‘robots’ and future technologies. Half of our respond-
ents had ‘some familiarity’ with ethics in technology
design. When offered a list of ten ethical principles to
rank in importance, the four most highly ranked were,
respectively, safety, privacy, transparency and security.
These were significantly beyond other principles includ-
ing integrity, non-discrimination, autonomy, dignity,
efficiency and equity respectively.8 Privacy and trans-
parency are dominant in formal and informal state-
ments on ethics of AI in Europe and are the focus of
attention in technology developments. However, the
significance of safety to our respondents is notable
and further supported by their responses in relation
to positive and negative expectations of AI.
Over two-thirds of our respondents agree that it ‘is
“possible” to design AI in an ethical manner’.
However, participants were evenly split between those
who agree and disagree that we can ‘design AI to
respect human dignity and values’. A clear majority
felt that AI demanded a ‘higher ethical standard’
than other areas of technological design. When
probed, a majority (63%) agreed with the statement
that ‘AI reflects the biases of its engineers and design-
ers’. When asked whether AI designers are ‘responsible
for the use and misuse of the technical systems they
build’, over half of participants agreed. When asked
‘who is in control of AI design?’ they answered: indus-
try (28%), academic research (23%), and research fun-
ders (21%) followed by governments, regulators, other
(UN, social media corps, no-one). When asked ‘who do
you feel should be responsible for AI impact’ respond-
ents gave different answers: governments (23%), state
regulators (21%), industry (18%), academia (18%),
followed by funders, others (independent authorities).
In other words, industry and academic researchers are
viewed as in control of the trajectory of innovation,
whereas public authorities should be responsible
for impact.
Our interpretation of these findings is that the issues
which relate most directly to a positive individual expe-
rience with AI, and are widely discussed in society by a
range of actors, are dominant for our respondents.
Safety is a key issue in relation to future technologies,
including autonomous cars, but it is also relevant to
location enabled communication technologies. Safety
also features in fictionalised narratives and respondents
mentioned the Terminator movies. Privacy,
transparency and responsibility are important for our
respondents and highly evident in our sample of formal
and informal statements on AI.9 Other ethical issues
may be less clearly understood, although there appears
to be agreement on a role for governments or public
agencies in managing AI impact while greater trust is
placed in AI researchers working in universities. These
findings are again mostly in line with large-scale sur-
veys in the UK, which found an expectation that aca-
demics ‘would be the driving force behind it (AI) in its
embryonic and early stages,’ (Ipsos/MORI, 2017: 50)
with concerns that private industry is ‘not subject to the
same scrutiny and accountability as the public sector’
(Ipsos/MORI, 2017: 47). The public expectation of
state responsibility for controlling AI impact in the
UK and Ireland is important, but complicated by the
collaborative nature of AI research and innovation
programmes in these countries, as identified in our doc-
ument analysis.
Overall, it is clear that our respondents have some
difficulty conceptualising abstract ethical principles
and values, but their attitudes are influenced by societal
expectations, high profile news and fictional stories and
to a more limited degree their own experiences. They
are more concerned with things that might occur rather
than more mundane questions such as what the most
appropriate levels of automation in information, enter-
tainment and public services should be. The latter is as
much a social and regulatory question as an ethical
one, and is linked to our expectations and traditions
of political accountability and transparency (Eubanks,
2018). If scientifically literate members of the public
have difficulty grasping abstract ethical issues, we
need to carefully consider how employees who are
tasked with designing and deploying these systems
will fare.
The performativity of expectations
of AI and the practice of communication
governance
Our multi-level analysis suggests that a range of actors
construct the expectation that AI technologies will pro-
vide significant opportunities for economic growth but
also raise a range of ethical concerns. These expecta-
tions are useful for justifying significant investments,
and supporting a particular innovation dynamic, but
they say little about the challenges of applying these
technologies in particular social contexts.
Contemporary AI is dominated by ML approaches
including deep learning. It is methods focussed and
domain agnostic. If we are to understand the effective
performance of societal expectations of AI and emerg-
ing ethical frameworks they must be tailored to specific
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domains. One such domain is communication
governance.
As communication platforms and services like
Facebook and Twitter extend across borders, the
scale and speed of data being dealt with has grown
exponentially. The current application of AI in com-
mercial communication governance highlights a
number of limitations. For example, AI technologies
base their predictions on pre-existing big datasets and
thus they make their decisions by looking backwards,
and without understanding culture, context and mean-
ing. Moreover, human communication constantly
evolves and is highly contextual. Some clearly defined
words, images and practices can be automatically
detected and removed, but identifying new forms of
appropriate and acceptable content is challenging
(Gillespie, 2018). Moderating harassment, racism,
sexism, and misinformation online is highly complex,
and cannot be achieved by AI alone (Ging and Siapera,
2018). Large scale gaming communities like Activision
Blizzard’s World of Warcraft use AI but are still
plagued by privacy violations, user harassment and
unauthorised cheating (Kerr, 2017).
Contemporary communication governance is a
multi-level phenomenon where solutions like AI are
only one part of a complex assemblage involving
human and non-human actors and including legal
documents, in-house community management policies
and national or regional regulatory frameworks (Kerr
et al., 2014). Despite the application of AI, most com-
mercial games and communication platforms rely on
users to flag unfair, abusive or disturbing content.
They also rely on databases being constantly updated
by significant human labour. This is not the highly
skilled, well paid work that most documents on AI
refer to. Despite societal expectations that AI will auto-
mate poorly paid occupations, AI requires extensive
human decision making – from training tools, to mod-
erating and removing unwanted content. A large
number of poorly paid community and content roles
are required in communication governance (Roberts,
2018). They make decisions on removing culturally
and contextually difficult flagged content and whistle-
blowers have revealed the psychological damage of this
work (Kerr and Kelleher, 2015; O’Connell, 2019).
While AI may reduce the financial and psychological
costs of some human moderation at scale, AI still
requires human workers to make complex communica-
tion decisions, and in some instances to explain unfair
automated decisions. Thus, AI can be a helpful servant,
but in many instances the humans are serving and help-
ing AI overcome its limitations.
Our study reveals a disconnect between societal
expectations and practice around the design and
deployment of AI. For current computer and data
scientists, ethics and responsibility remain at an
abstract level and have not been part of their profes-
sional training. Nor are they part of current agile and
iterative approaches to data science projects such as
‘The Cross-Industry Standard Process for Data
Mining’ (CRISP-DM). The 76-page CRISP-DM
manual contains just one reference to ‘ethics’ where it
is framed in terms of ‘constraints’ and limited to the use
of the data (Chapman et al., 2000: 33). The most recent
professional guidelines from the ACM Code of Ethics
and Professional Conduct (2018) and the IEEE (2019)
that we reviewed recognise that those building intelli-
gent systems in different domains may face ethical chal-
lenges, but as yet there are few practical solutions as to
how these challenges can be addressed, and it is unclear
what sanctions are imposed on those who violate them.
Abstract values, while useful for guiding high level eth-
ical discourse, are difficult to apply in practice, as
observed with the variety of competing metrics to mea-
sure ‘fairness’ in AI development (Bird et al, 2019).
And while ‘transparency’ is a prominent public concern
in our survey, studies suggest we are unlikely to devel-
op a kind of AI transparency the public can understand
(Burrell, 2016), and it may be an unrealistic ideal dis-
tracting us from persistent civic rights concerns and
deeper ideological and political questions of account-
ability when AI solutions are deployed in different
domains (Ananny and Crawford, 2018; Dencik et al.,
2017; Eubanks, 2018).
Both high level guidelines and professional codes of
ethics are an example of the formal articulation of soci-
etal expectations of AI. They tend to reflect ethical
frameworks most aligned to deterministic views of pre-
diction and are focused on outcomes, rights and duties
of what are assumed to be autonomous individuals.
These frameworks mostly operate as corporate and
professional responses to societal calls for more regu-
lation of AI, but may be inadequate for dealing with
highly contextual and dynamic human communica-
tions. Alternative ethical frameworks might more effec-
tively describe the relational interactions involved in
developing and deploying AI – especially for public
services and communications. For example, virtue
ethics can address cultural and political aspects of
design practice (Barry et al., 2017), while an ethic of
‘care’ could focus on data relationships in communica-
tion governance (Barry and Kerr, 2018). Further, exist-
ing communication policy and practice has a history of
ideals, norms, and laws that seek to balance the indi-
vidual and collective good in communication. There is
now a strong need for these broader national and
transnational communication policies to evolve to
take account of the role and impact of AI on mediated
forms of human communication.
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Conclusion
The sociology of expectations offers a useful approach
for identifying the actors, mechanisms and expectations
emerging around AI, and assessing the divergence
between expectations and current practices in the appli-
cation of AI. In our analysis, we identified a range of
actors articulating positive expectations of AI over the
past eight years through formal reports, public consul-
tations and research programmes. From 2016 we iden-
tified significant activity at European, national and
professional levels to agree high level ethical principles
and offset both negative statements and the revelations
of whistle-blowers and workers on current applications
of AI. While ethical guidelines and principles are pro-
liferating, and far from uniform, it is unclear how they
can be operationalised in different domains. In prac-
tice, corporations and coalitions of industry and public
research bodies design AI, and both corporations and
public organisations apply AI, but there is ambiguity
around who is responsible for monitoring its impact, or
what sanctions can be imposed. Meanwhile, members
of the public believe it is possible to design ‘ethical AI’
and that biases present in AI reflect its designers, who
are also in part responsible for its use and misuse. This
quite accurately describes the bind in which many of
those working in AI development find themselves, both
under increasing pressure from society to engage in
‘ethical’ AI practice, and expected to adhere to a
range of organisational and professional incentives
which may be in conflict with these ethical positions.
Recent attempts to develop ethical guidelines and to
design ethical technological solutions, including on
explainability, are clearly responses to wider societal
concerns about the limitations of contemporary forms
of domain agnostic AI. However, these approaches are
still limited and problematic when applied in the com-
munication governance contexts. At best, ethics guide-
lines are generically performative, operating at a
linguistic level to assuage and deflect critique and reg-
ulation. Indeed, we argue that ethics discourses and
solutions are currently operating as assurance for
investors and the general public, rather than as an
effective tool for governance – either of developers or
of communication service users. The gap between soci-
etal expectations of AI, and AI in practice, will remain
until we understand and accept the limitations of AI in
complex social contexts and recognise that non-
technological policies and human workers are required
to make AI work ethically. Organisational and profes-
sional policies must be supplemented by robust trans-
national policies and regulations that make
corporations, research institutes and organisations
responsible for the human labour involved in deploying
AI, and accountable for its social impacts.
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Notes
1. The singularity refers to the prospect that ‘ordinary
humans will be overtaken by artificially intelligent
machines or cognitively enhanced biological intelligence
or both.’ See Shanahan (2015).
2. See https://www.turing.ac.uk/about-us
3. See supplementary file for sources.
4. For example, ‘citizen scoring’ appears alongside ‘lethal
autonomous weapons systems’ in High-Level Expert
Group on Artificial Intelligence (2019: 34).
5. In October 2019 the Irish government launched a national
public consultation on AI.
6. Eurobarometer (2017) found very low levels of use of
robots at home or in work in Europe.
7. Public research programmes in Ireland do not invest in
military research.
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8. The list of ethics principles was based on our literature
review and inputs from the ADAPT ethics and privacy
working group.
9. The EU General Data Protection Regulation was intro-
duced in 2016, elevating awareness of privacy.
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